Inevitable Imbalance:
Why FTC v. Actavis Was Inadequate to Solve the
Reverse Payment Settlement Problem and Proposing a
New Amendment to the Hatch–Waxman Act
Rachel A. Lewis*
The law regarding reverse payment settlements is anything but settled. Reverse payment settlements are settlements that occur during a
patent infringement litigation in which a pharmaceutical patent holder
pays a generic drug producer to not infringe on the pharmaceutical patent.1 Despite the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,2 there are still unanswered questions about how the
“full rule of reason” analysis3 will be applied to reverse payment settle*
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1. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012). Other names for reverse
payment settlements include “pay for delay” settlements and “exclusion payments.” See, e.g., Robert
A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, FTC v. Actavis: Inviting a More Nimble Rule of Reason,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 29, 51; Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)
(No. 12-416) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief in Support of FTC], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-416
_pet_amcu_118-prof-etal.authcheckdam.pdf.
2. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). This case was decided on June 17, 2013. Id.
3. The full rule of reason is the basic way to analyze antitrust suits. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 57
(2006). Explaining the rule of reason analysis further is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, a basic statement of the full rule of reason can be summarized as follows:
Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . . the rule of reason . . . requires the fact finder to
decide whether under all the circumstances the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition. It requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances to decide whether the practice constitutes such an unreasonable restraint. The inquiry mandated by the rule is whether the agreement is one that promotes competition or whether it
suppresses competition. A restraint is unreasonable if it has an adverse impact on competition and cannot be justified as a pro-competitive measure. A combination is not legal
merely because some persons other than the members of the combination have profited
by its operation.
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ments.4 Now, another legislative amendment regarding reverse payment
settlements has been proposed in Congress, 5 and the Actavis decision
fails to address both public and private concerns focused on by legal
scholarship.6
To contextualize the issues underlying reverse payment settlements,
FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 7 —the Eleventh Circuit decision
reversed in Actavis—provides an instructive example. In Watson, a
pharmaceutical patent holder sued two generic drug companies for infringing on its patent rights.8 Responsively, the two generic drug producers challenged the validity 9 of the pharmaceutical patent. 10 Before the
court entered judgment regarding the patent’s validity, the patent holder
and generic drug producers settled.11 Thus, the parties avoided establishing a final judgment about the validity of the underlying patent.12 By the
terms of the settlement, the generic drug producers agreed to dismiss the
suit, not produce the patented product until a certain date, and promote
the patented product for the patent holder.13 In exchange, the patent holder agreed to pay the generic producers between $72 million and $360
million over the course of six years.14 The patent holder did this to protect its own profits, which were estimated at $125 million per year ($750
million over six years).15 The size of the settlement payments by the patent holder has been criticized as anticompetitive because the patent
holder is spending such a large portion of its yearly profits to avoid a

Id. (internal citations omitted).
4. The holding was that “the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed,” not that reverse payment settlements are per se valid or invalid. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
5. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
6. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief in Support of FTC, supra note 1, at 1–2 (suggesting that they
are seeking the right balance between innovation and competition when rejecting the scope of the
patent test).
7. Watson, 677 F.3d 1298.
8. Id. at 1305.
9. Whether a patent is valid depends on many factors, which are not the focus of this Comment. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012) (discussing respectively patentable subject matter,
novelty, and non-obviousness requirements). Suffice it to say that if a patent dispute is litigated to a
final judgment and the patent is found to be invalid, then the patent holder could no longer enforce
the patent exclusivity.
10. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.

2014]

Inevitable Imbalance

1061

judicial decision regarding its patent’s validity, which would potentially
make the market more competitive.16
These settlements have been called antitrust violations by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)17 and legal scholarship;18 meanwhile, the
majority of the federal courts found the settlements near per se legal because the settlement was within the rights of the patent holder to negotiate prior to Actavis.19 Reverse settlement payments occur in part because
of the complex regulatory framework of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Restoration Act (the Hatch–Waxman Act or the Act).20
This Comment argues that despite the outcome in Actavis, the
structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act will create repeated conflicts between antitrust law and patent law because it attempts to use private actors as proxies for the interests of externalities. Thus, the only long-term
solution is to pass a legislative amendment and have the government assume responsibility for litigating the validity of weak patents in the reverse-payment settlement context.21
To support this thesis, Part I sets out the background of the unique
regulatory scheme created in the Hatch–Waxman Act while also locating
the stakeholders in a real world context. Part II discusses how pharmaceutical patent holders have responded to litigation stemming from the
Act and the range of agreements that have arisen between patent holders
and generic producers. Part III discusses the judicial history of the various reverse-payment settlement cases and explains why the Supreme
Court’s decision in Actavis does not resolve the anticompetitive potential
of reverse-payment settlement. Part IV discusses previously proposed
reverse-payment settlement legislation and why such legislation would
16. See Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV.
283, 288 (2012) (stating that “even though patent holders get a presumption of patent validity, they
lose 48%–73% of patent cases . . . .”).
17. Richard A. Feinstein, Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription
Drugs, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 3, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-anticompetitive-pay-delay-settleme
nts-pharmaceutical/p859910payfordelay.pdf (prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Courts
and Competition Policy of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary).
18. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 491–92 (2007).
19. Compare Watson, 677 F.3d at 1308–09 (supporting the scope of the patent test which presumes patent validity), with In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (only
circuit court case finding that antitrust violations occurred despite the reverse-payment settlement
being within the exclusionary scope of the patent).
20. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman Act),
35 U.S.C. § 156 (codified in part in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
21. See infra Part V.B for specific language of the proposed amendment.
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fail to solve the underlying issue of patent validity. Part V proposes (A)
that the incentive structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act is inherently
flawed; and (B) that a government body, potentially the FTC, should be
given standing by Congress to directly litigate weak pharmaceutical patents after a reverse-payment settlement occurs. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
I. THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT: THEORETICAL FORMATION AND
UNANTICIPATED RESULTS
The Hatch–Waxman Act is, in part, an attempt to incentivize the
discovery and invalidation of weak drug patents22—those issued patents
that may not be valid.23 This Part discusses both the formation as well as
the technical mechanisms of the Act.
A. Formation of the Hatch–Waxman Act
When it comes to pharmaceutical patent validity, consumers, the
government, and generic producers have a naturally aligned interest in
invalidation. When a generic drug enters the market because a drug is no
longer patented, the drug price drops by approximately 80%.24 The consumer has an interest in low-cost drugs.25 The government, while trying
to balance the public and private interests,26 has favored the public good
22. Although the Act is generally characterized as a balance between the interests of generic
producers and patent holders, the former legislative scheme was highly favorable to the patent holders, and the pharmaceutical patent holder lobby group objected to the patent act changes throughout
the Act’s drafting and enactment. Compare H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984) (the statement by the
patent holder lobby group: “a group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form
articulated its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create
unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.”) (original capitalization omitted), with id. (“Congressman Waxman engaged in extensive negotiations with interested
parties. The primary participants were the generic pharmaceutical industry associations (GPIA) and
the pharmaceutical manufacturers association (PMA).”) (original capitalization omitted).
23 . See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. 1347 (2008). As Farrell and Shapiro theorize, “The bigger issue [than blatantly invalid patents], . . . concerns patents that are not clearly invalid, but are weak—they may well be invalid, but
nobody knows for sure without conclusive litigation.” Id. (emphasis in original).
24. “Generally hundreds of millions and, not infrequently, billions of dollars are at stake for the
brand company. If the generic company successfully defends against the infringement claim, competition occurs. The generic will quickly take as much as 80 percent of the brand’s prescriptions in a
matter of months.” Michael Kades, Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 143, 147 (2009).
25. One commentator noted, “On four blockbusters alone, consumers are expected to save over
16 billion dollars because of generic entry prior to patent expiration.” Id.
26. See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implication of Patent Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing].
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over the interests of the private parties in the pharmaceutical industry.27
Also, the government itself is a customer of pharmaceutical drugs, which
suggests that it has an interest in patent invalidity.28 Finally, the generic
drug producer’s interests are financial. The generic drug companies make
money by selling off-patent drugs to as many consumers as possible.29
By doing this, the generic companies make their profits by avoiding research and development costs—which exponentially increase overhead
costs—by selling formerly patented products.30
When drafting the Hatch–Waxman Act, Congress seemingly assumed that the consumer, governmental, and generic interests would remain aligned. So Congress had a stroke of brilliance: incentivize generic
companies to challenge pharmaceutical patent validity, 31 and the consumers will vicariously benefit.32 Thus, the theoretical negotiation of the
Hatch–Waxman Act seemed to leave all of the stakeholders happy. All of
the stakeholders, that is, except the pharmaceutical patent holders.33
Pharmaceutical patent holders were in a bind. For years the pharmaceutical companies had borne the almost prohibitively high costs of
pioneer drug development.34 The discovery of a new drug was costly and
[The Act was] intended to balance two important public policy goals. First, drug manufacturers need meaningful market protection incentives to encourage the development of
valuable new drugs. Second, once the statutory patent protection and market exclusivity
for these new drugs has expired, the public benefits from the rapid availability of lowerprice generic versions of the innovator drug.
Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984), supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. In one FTC report on the costs of reverse payment settlements, the FTC points out that
“[t]he federal government is particularly affected: Federal dollars accounted for an estimated 31
percent of the $235 billion spent on prescription drugs in 2008, and that share is expected to rise to
40 percent by 2018.” Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3.
29. The generic producers avoid huge costs by not innovating new drugs. In one year, pharmaceutical patent holders spent a combined $50 billion investment in life science research. Senate
Hearing, supra note 26, at 10.
30. Id.
31. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2013) (companies could file drug applications based on the invalidity of a currently patented drug).
32. By 2009, after the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, consumers had saved an estimated $734 billion, at an estimated rate of $121 billion a year, which outstripped the original estimate of
$1 billion in savings expected over the course of ten years. S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)
(resolution introduced in the Senate).
33. “A group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form articulated its
reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.” H.R. REP. No. 98–857(II) (1984)
(original capitalization omitted); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 26, at 10 (statement of Sen.
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
34. Estimates of the cost of research and development for each new drug compound to the
value on the day of market approval was roughly $194 million in 1990; other estimates have been as
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risky, but the patent holders continued to fund research because even one
pharmaceutical patent was incredibly lucrative.35 The lucrative nature of
the business model was directly linked to the patent monopoly.36 These
monopolies were so lucrative that the pharmaceutical companies put in
incredible lobbying efforts to extend and take advantage of the former
legislative scheme. 37 Prior to the Hatch–Waxman Act, even after drug
patents naturally expired, generic companies would not produce the offpatent drugs because the companies had to first duplicate all of the FDA
tests.38 The Hatch–Waxman Act changed all of that.
Part of the negotiation of the Act included allowing the generic
producers to piggy-back on the FDA testing done by the pharmaceutical
patent holders.39 The Act also incentivizes generic companies to file applications to produce drugs because it gives the first generic company a
short exclusivity period.40 Thus, Congress made filing easier and cheaper, and enticed generic companies to take advantage of the deal. And it
succeeded; the Act revolutionized the landscape of the pharmaceutical
drug market.41
B. The Technical Mechanisms of the Act
The most pro-generic change under the Hatch–Waxman Act was
the creation of the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).42 Part of
the incredible expense of patenting a new drug is the required new drug
application (NDA).43 In NDAs, the pharmaceutical patent holders have to
show that the drugs meet the requirements of the FDA through drug testhigh as $802 million per drug. Shannon U. Han, Note, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The CircuitSplitting Headache Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 919 n. 34 (2013).
35. Typical profit margins range from 90%–95%. Barbara Martinez & Jacob Goldstein, Big
Pharma Faces Grim Prognosis: Industry Fails to Find New Drugs to Replace Wonders Like Lipitor,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at A1.
36. See Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1476 n. 28 (2008).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984) (“A group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form articulated its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation
and research, create unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.”) (original capitalization omitted).
38. The Hatch–Waxman Act was negotiated because of “[t]he inability of generics to obtain
approval for these post-1962 drugs without enormous expenditures of money for duplicative tests.”
Id. (original capitalization omitted).
39. Holman, supra note 18, at 510–11.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2013).
41. See generally S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (describing over $700 billion in
savings by American consumers since the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, which far exceeded
the expected savings of $1 billion annually).
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
43. See id. § 355(b).
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ing.44 Under the old system, the generic drug producers who wanted to
sell an off-patent drug would have to duplicate these tests.45 After the
passage of the Act, generic producers are able to file an ANDA instead.46
The ANDA simply verifies that the drug to be produced is a bioequivalent47 to the previously approved drug.48 This abbreviated process significantly reduces costs for the generic producers and significantly raises
competition for the original patent holder.49
When filing an ANDA, the generic drug producer must cite one of
four bases laid out in the Act for its application.50 Paragraph IV—the
fourth basis—justifies the application on the fact that the patented drug is
“invalid or will not be infringed.”51 All reverse-payment settlement litigation is an outgrowth of Paragraph IV litigation. 52 Paragraph IV requires that the applicant generic drug producers include information
about the bioequivalence of their ANDA to a patent holder’s NDA.53 The
bioequivalence requirement leads to controversy because if the generic
company successfully applies under Paragraph IV, the patent will become invalid earlier than the date of patent expiration, and the exclusivity rights of the patent holder will end.54
Several administrative steps take place before the patent is declared
invalid. First, the patent holder is sent notice of the ANDA55 because,
technically, an ANDA is an act of patent infringement.56 Then the patent
holder has forty-five days to initiate an infringement suit against the ge-

44. See id.
45. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
47. Bio-equivalent essentially means that there is not a change to the chemical structure of the
drug’s active ingredient. See Holman, supra note 18, at 491–92.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
49. Cheng, supra note 36, at 1476 n. 30.
50. The four bases are “(I) that such patent information has not been filed, (II) that such patent
has expired, (III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
51. Id.
52. “Nearly all reverse payment settlements stem from patent-infringement litigation where the
generic entrant certifies that the patent is either invalid or not infringed. This is known as paragraph
IV certification.” Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments:
Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 64 (2010); see also Holman, supra note 18, at 494
(2007); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
54. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
55. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
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neric producer, or it will passively concede validity.57 Assuming that the
patent holder initiates an infringement suit, an automatic stay is initiated,
which stops the ANDA from being approved until either (a) thirty
months pass; or (b) the court hearing the patent challenge finds the patent
either invalid or not infringed.58
These mechanisms essentially require (1) the generic producer to
constructively infringe on the patent; (2) the patent holder to file suit if it
wants to retain its monopoly; and (3) the patent holder to either litigate,
settle, or lose its patent monopoly. The cost of litigation is high for both
parties, and the risk of patent invalidity is incredibly costly for patent
holders.59 The risk of infringement is similarly high for generic producers, and the value of the patent monopoly far outmatches the cost of settling the suit.60
In fact, pharmaceutical patents are so valuable that patent holders
can settle Paragraph IV litigation for more than the generic producers
would make by actually producing the drug.61 Some studies even indicate
that patent holders could pay settlements to over five generic challengers
and still make a profit.62 Furthermore, this level of profit would make it
economically illogical and bad business for a patent holder to litigate
even strong patents.63
On the other hand, if the generic producer’s Paragraph IV ANDA
was approved by the FDA—either through litigation or because the pa57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii).
58. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
59. See supra note 24.
60. “Left to their own devices, both the incumbent monopolist and the entrant are better off if
they eliminate competition and share the monopoly profits.” Kades, supra note 24, at 148.
61. Id.
62. Id.
Assume that the brand product has yearly sales of one billion dollars. A single generic,
assuming it takes 80 percent of the brand’s sales and prices at a 30 percent discount, will
earn roughly 560 million dollars in revenue. In contrast, if five generics enter, they drive
the price down to 33 percent of the brand price. The total generic revenue will fall to 267
million dollars. In other words, if the brand has to pay the full revenue of the generics, it
would actually cost more than twice as much to buy off one generic than five generics.
Id.
63. Id. at 150.
The important point is that, whether competition is certain . . . the patent is weak . . . or
the patent is strong . . . [,] the brand and the generic are better off preserving the monopoly by having the branded firm pay the generic company not to enter. . . . The strength of
the patent—how likely it is to block competition—would not determine when there is
competition; rather, the profits the branded firm earns by eliminating the threat of generic
competition and the brand’s willingness to share those profits determines when competition would occur.
Id.
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tent holder did not challenge the application—the generic producer
would get a 180-day exclusivity period during which it would be the only
competitor for the patent holder.64 Prior to the expiration of this exclusivity period, other generic producers’ applications would not be approved,
thus giving the generic producer a short monopoly where it could charge
a super-competitive price.65 Furthermore, the 180-day period would not
be triggered until the first-to-file generic drug producer began commercial marketing.66 This strategy would allow the first-to-file generic producer to prevent other generic producers from entering the market.67 All
the first-to-file generic company would have to do is never begin commercial marketing. 68 This practice, called “bottlenecking,” meant that
patent holders and first-to-file generic producers negotiated bottlenecking deals to extend the patent monopoly beyond its legal scope.69 Bottlenecking deals, the first form of reverse payment settlements, were subsequently found to be per se illegal under antitrust law by the courts.70
Thus, eliminating the provision that allows only one generic producer to
gain first-to-file exclusivity would not help invalidate weak patents.71
II. THE RANGE OF PARAGRAPH IV REVERSE-PAYMENT
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
After pharmaceutical patent holders failed to lobby to keep the
Hatch–Waxman Act from being enacted, they tried to figure out how to
regain lost ground under the new regulatory scheme. The pharmaceutical
patent holders acted in their own profit maximizing self-interest—as is
expected of rational actors in a competitive economic system—to find
ways to make the new law beneficial to their businesses. One solution
created by the patent holders was to make reverse payment settlements

64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
65. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
66. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
67. Seiko F. Okada, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation: Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements Go Beyond the “Scope of the Patent,” 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 303, 312 (2012) (“Accordingly, a
subsequent filer of an ANDA is prohibited from marketing its generic drug until after the first-filer’s
exclusivity period has ended. Therefore, the settling first-filer and innovator could effectively ‘bottleneck’ the market by preventing any other generic from selling the drug.”).
68. Id.
69 . Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over ReversePayment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008).
70. See infra Part II.A.
71. See Kades, supra note 24, at 159 (“eliminating the 180-day exclusivity outright may have
the unintended consequence of making pay-for-delay settlements more common”).
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when generic companies challenged their patent validity.72 These Paragraph IV litigation settlements have come under scrutiny because of their
potentially anticompetitive effects.73
In Paragraph IV litigations, courts consider three potentially anticompetitive reverse payment settlements: (A) outside-the-scope patent
settlements; (B) inside-the-scope patent settlements; and (C) potential
sham exchanges that hide anticompetitive agreements. Both outside-thescope settlements agreements and sham exchanges are clear violations of
antitrust law. 74 But inside-the-scope agreements have split the circuits
and caught the attention of the Supreme Court.75
A. Outside-the-Scope Patent Settlements
Outside-the-scope patent settlement agreements were the FTC’s
first antitrust suits brought in response to Paragraph IV litigation.76 Outside-the-scope reverse payment settlements effectively expand the patent
rights beyond what a patent legally grants the patent holder.77 One example of an outside-the-scope settlement is when a patent holder and a generic company agree to use the mechanisms of the Act to delay generic
entry into the market in a settlement agreement after a court finds the
patent invalid.78 The patent holder and the generic producer agree that
the generic would never begin commercial marketing, thus not triggering
the first-to-file exclusivity period.79 This agreement prevents other generic companies from entering the market and creates a potential perpetual
monopoly. 80 This singular outside-the-scope settlement actually led to
72. See Timothy A. Weil, Note, Devising a Legislative Solution to the Reverse Payment Settlement Dilemma: How Congress Can Balance Competition, Innovation, and the Public Policy Favoring the Settlement of Disputes Without Litigation, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 741, 759 (2011) (“[T]he
complexity of reverse payment settlements has made it increasingly difficult for courts and the FTC
to determine the reasonableness of reverse payments without launching a complex inquiry into the
terms of the agreement and the business judgment of the settling parties.”).
73. See infra Part III.
74. Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 466 F.3d 187, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2006); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding a reverse-payment settlement to be an
antitrust violation because it extended patent rights beyond the exclusionary scope the patent rights
granted to the patent holder); see also Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 16, at 286 (“[U]nless the patent was a sham or procured by fraud, reverse payment settlements were illegal only if the settlement
exceeded the scope of the patent . . . .”).
75. See infra Part III.
76. Holman, supra note 18, at 547.
77. Jeff Thomas, Note, Schering-Plough and In Re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse Payments in
the Hatch–Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 43–44 (2007).
78. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2012).
79. See infra Part III.
80. See infra Part III.
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two different cases in which both courts found the settlement to be per se
antitrust violations.81
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Andrx Pharmaceuticals v. Biovail Corp. International, setting the precedent for finding
that an outside of the scope patent settlement constituted an anticompetitive antitrust violation.82 In Andrx, a generic producer and a pharmaceutical patent holder agreed to a scheme that manipulated the structure of
the Act to allow for delayed generic market entry. 83 First, the generic
producer won its invalidity suit, which ended the patent holder’s right to
a monopoly on the drug.84 Next, the patent holder agreed to pay the generic producer $40 million a year for each year that the generic producer
could produce the drug but did not do so. 85 This agreement was valuable
to the patent holder because no other generic producer could enter the
market until the first generic producer triggered and completed the firstto-file exclusivity period.86 If the arrangement continued, then the (former) patent holder would have a continuing monopoly over the particular
drug, despite a court finding that it had no right to the monopoly.
Because of the anticompetitive attributes of the settlement, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals found that it could “reasonably be viewed as an
attempt to allocate market share and preserve monopolistic conditions.”87
Accordingly, the court rejected the validity of the post-judgment agreement between the patent holder and the first generic producer because it
inappropriately extended the patent monopoly.88 Furthermore, the court
pointed out that “[a]lthough it is true that the first to file an ANDA is
permitted to delay marketing as long as it likes, the statutory scheme
does not envision the first applicant’s agreeing with the patentholder [sic]
of the pioneer drug to delay the start of the 180-day exclusivity period.”89

81. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
82. See generally id.; see also In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing the importance of the
precedent to reverse payment settlements).
83. James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 37, 43.
84. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing Andrx, 686 F.3d 197).
85. See id. Under the agreement, “[the former patent holder] would pay [the generic drug producer] $40 million per year beginning on the date that [the generic drug producer] received final
approval from the FDA and ending on the date that [the generic drug producer] either began selling
[the generic drug] or was adjudged liable for patent infringement in the pending suit;” see also Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
86. Andrx Pharm., 256 F.3d at 809–10.
87. Id. at 811.
88. Id. at 809.
89. Id.
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Thus, in Andrx, the requirements of antitrust prevention and the intention
of the Act align to prevent extending the monopoly of an invalid patent.90
The next case, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, established
the original per se antitrust violation test as applied to Hatch–Waxman
agreements. 91 The Cardizem case concerned the same settlement as
Andrx.92 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also disfavored these types
of agreements because of their anticompetitive effects.93 The Sixth Circuit described the agreement as “a naked, horizontal restraint of trade
that is per se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect of reducing
competition in the market for Cardizem CD and its generic equivalents to
the detriment of consumers.”94 The court concluded that this attempt to
eliminate competition was a “classic example of per se illegal restraint of
trade.”95 This presumption acted as a strong deterrent of similar future
agreements outside of the scope of the patent term.
Yet despite the strong language of the court regarding outside of the
scope agreements, the court actually discussed how to legally take advantage of the patent monopolies. The court stated that “it is one thing to
take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting
competitors . . . .”96 This comparison is credited with inspiring the legal
inside the scope reverse-payments settlements.97
B. Inside-the-Scope Patent Settlements
Reverse payment settlements where the terms of the settlement do
not go beyond the powers granted to the patent holder by the patent are
within or inside the scope of the patent. These reverse payment settlements are where the legal battle rages. The scope of the patent case history is documented in Part III, but it is important to first understand why
the issue is not easily resolved.
Reverse payment settlements exist between a rock and a hard place:
antitrust and patent law. At what point does exercising patent monopoly
rights cross over into violating antitrust laws?98 “It is the tension between
90. Id. at 799.
91. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2012).
92. Id. at 210.
93. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
94. Id. at 911.
95. Id. at 908.
96. Id.
97. Carrier, supra note 85, at 1.
98. See generally THE SUPREME COURT AND PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES (Philip B. Kurland et
al. eds., 1975).
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restraints on anti-competitive [sic] behavior imposed by the Sherman Act
and grants of patent monopolies under the patent laws, as complicated by
the Hatch–Waxman Act, that underlies [a reverse-payment settlement]
appeal.”99
Within the scope settlements also create theoretical problems, forcing the courts to assess difficult jurisprudential and practical considerations. First, jurisprudentially, the courts must consider the proper role of
the judiciary in disputes and how to construe settlement agreements. Second, practically, the courts have to weigh the interests of a multitude of
stakeholders, all of which stand to lose millions to billions of dollars if
the “wrong” test is applied.
1. Jurisprudential Realities:
Justice, Efficiency, Neutrality, and Presumptions
The courts are struggling with the competing jurisprudential values
of neutrality, justice, and efficiency. Every opinion that held reverse
payment settlements legal justified itself in part because of the policy in
favor of settlements, which promote efficiency. 100 The settlements are
considered efficient because they (1) “ease the burdens on courts”; (2)
“decrease[] the expense and risk of litigation for parties”; and (3) “can
result in a more satisfying resolution than would occur in litigation, because in negotiation the parties are free to consider the entire spectrum of
relevant facts and principles . . . .”101 But in the case of reverse payment
settlements, the justifications for promoting settlements are not applicable to the intended beneficiaries of the Act.102
For example, one counterweight to efficiency is justice. In the particular realm of reverse payment settlements, the settlements themselves
may not be legal.103 Applying the policy of an efficient settlement to justify an illegal settlement is illogical, at best. In the case of reverse payment settlements, it is unlikely that either the “scope of the patent test” or

99. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006).
100. For example, the Ciprofloxacin court said, “[T]here is a long-standing policy in the law in
favor of settlements, and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation.” In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101 . Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36–37 (1996).
102. “[Michael] Carrier suggests that the Hatch–Waxman regime reflects a policy in favor of
patent challenges, that the regulatory regime is relatively ineffective in achieving this purpose, and
that reverse payments are ‘uniquely concerning’ because they allow branded and generic manufacturers to limit competition.” David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment
Settlements in Hatch–Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1322 (2010).
103. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
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the per se antitrust test adequately aligns the courts’ decisions with the
most just result.104
Although courts and parties enjoy the certainty that presumptions
provide, reverse payment settlements are an area where caution is appropriate. Presumptions should stem from a history of correlation or an expression of the general sense of courts’ policy foundations.105 And although presumption tests are efficient, the tests should not truncate
justice.106 While embodying their role as a neutral arbiter, courts should
view both tests with a healthy dose of apprehension. 107 Any reversepayment legislation should allow a court to act neutrally when considering reverse-payment settlement litigation.
2. Practical Consequences: Battle Between Private and
Public Beneficiaries
Reverse payment settlements create a divide between interested
parties. Generally, the parties to the original patent validity suit—patent
holders and generic producers—seek “the scope of the patent” test for
evaluating reverse payment settlements.108 Conversely, the government
and consumers favor the FTC test. 109 Although the patent holders and
generic drug manufacturers are the parties to reverse-payment settlement
agreements, the government and consumers also have a high stake in
which test is adopted. In the Hatch–Waxman Act, the Legislature attempted to leverage private actions to benefit the public welfare.110 Consequently, private actors’ reasonable self-interest is pitted against the
overall public good. Unfortunately, pharmaceutical companies cannot
make maximum profits if the public pays minimal costs.

104. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120–21.
105. Thomas, supra note 77, at 16.
106. According to some scholars, the Court is moving away from a per se antitrust violation
rule:
Beginning in the late-1970s . . . , the Supreme Court set out to place significant limits on
the application of the per se rule and move ‘from a dichotomous categorical approach to a
more nuanced and case specific inquiry.’ Accordingly, it began to ‘reframe antitrust rules
around core economic concepts of anticompetitive effect, market power, and efficiencies,’ thereby eroding the long-standing analytical dichotomy.
Weil, supra note 72, at 759 (internal citations omitted).
107. Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 977, 1031 (2008) (“In the traditional conception of the adversarial system, the court plays the
role of neutral arbiter, deciding only the issues framed by the parties, based on the evidence provided
by the parties.”).
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. See Senate Hearings, supra note 26.
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The uncertainty linked to developing new life-saving medicines
creates high stakes for patent holders. In one year, pharmaceutical patent
holders spent a combined $50 billion investment in life science research.111 And even for only one drug, the risks and the costs are incredibly high: “When factoring in the costs of false starts and blind alleys, it
can take literally several hundred million dollars to bring an effective
new drug to market.”112 As one court noted, “[o]nly one in every 5,000
medicines tested for the potential to treat illness is eventually approved
for patient use, and studies estimate that developing a new drug takes 10
to 15 years and costs more than $1.3 billion.”113 Costs and timelines associated with developing new life-saving drugs demonstrate the incredible risks that pharmaceutical patent holders take. Accordingly, pharmaceutical patent holders argue that encouraging challenges to the validity
of their patents would “hamper innovation and research, create unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.”114
Meanwhile, the legislature tried to use generic drug manufacturers—another private actor—as a proxy for the government’s and consumers’ desired outcome: more generic drugs. This plan has backfired.
While both the public and the generic manufacturers benefit when a patent is declared invalid, all of the costs and risks of proving invalidity are
placed on the generic manufacturers. The costs and risks align patent
holders’ interests with the generic producers’ interests.
If the generic manufacturers and patent holders settle invalidity
suits for an amount higher than the expected profits for the generic producers but lower than the expected profits from maintained validity, both
companies reduce all of the risks tied up in litigation proceedings. For
example, three reverse payment settlements gave generic producers $60
million, 115 $49.1 million, 116 and $21 million, respectively. 117 As selfinterested private actors, it is only logical that generic producers would
settle rather than litigate because settlement offers a higher monetary
reward and lower relative risk.
For consumers—the intended beneficiaries of the Hatch–Waxman
Act—reverse settlement payments have real and life changing effects.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id.
113. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
114. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984).
115. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2012).
116. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
117. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2006).
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The settlements externalize costs to the detriment of consumers. In one
case, the court noted that “[t]hese settlements will delay generic entry,
forcing consumers to pay substantially higher prices for prescription
drugs. Already these deals are having an impact. A recent analysis by the
FTC economists estimate that these types of deals cost consumers $3.5
billion per year.”118 Another commentator looking at the monetary incentives in reverse payment settlements noted, “On four blockbusters alone,
consumers are expected to save over 16 billion dollars because of generic
entry prior to patent expiration.”119 Still, steep costs do not convey the
reality of the issue for consumers. During a Senate hearing regarding
proposed amendments to the Hatch–Waxman Act, one senator stated,
“[W]e must never lose sight of the hard fact of life that an unaffordable
medication may be the same as no medication at all.”120 Thus, consumers
have a collective monetary interest and health interests in invalidating
weak pharmaceutical patents.
Meanwhile, the government is trying to balance the public and private interests while also having its own interest as a drug consumer. In
one FTC report on the costs of reverse payment settlements, the FTC
noted, “The federal government is particularly affected: Federal dollars
accounted for an estimated 31 percent of the $235 billion spent on prescription drugs in 2008, and that share is expected to rise to 40 percent
by 2018.” 121 President Obama has supported the plan in his budget
statements. 122 Furthermore, the FTC has consistently litigated reverse
payment settlements as antitrust violations and campaigned Congress to
revise the Hatch–Waxman Act to support this position.123 Generally, the
Executive Branch administrative agencies have been in support of patent
invalidity.124
Critics of the scope of the patent test would characterize reversepayment settlements as patent holders effectively paying generic companies not to challenge the validity of their pharmaceutical patents.125 These settlements delay generic drugs from entering the market and manufacturers from selling the same product at a lower cost.126 Essentially, the
118. Kades, supra note 24, at 143.
119. Id.
120. Senate Hearing, supra note 26, at 3.
121. Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3.
122. Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch–Waxman
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 474 (2011).
123. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 17, at 1–2.
124. The U.S. Department of Justice originally supported the Court’s outside the scope of the
patent test, but later switched to support the FTC test. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 61–62.
125. Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3.
126. Id.
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effects of inside-the-scope settlements are the same as the effects of outside-the-scope settlements—only the certainty of invalidity has changed.
And here, the implication is that the patent holders simply realized that
their patents were invalid early enough to make an agreement with the
generic drug company. The unknown answer to the underlying question
is the key to resolving this issue: Is the underlying patent valid? This is
the true conflict with which the federal courts have been grappling. Thus,
the proposed legislation, discussed below, recommends a legislative
change targeting the central underlying issue: weak patent validity.
C. Sham Exchanges Creating Anticompetitive Agreements
Courts have alluded to one other type of reverse-payment settlement: sham consideration. 127 Some commentators consider sham exchanges to be the next evolution of the reverse-payment settlement problem.128 Sham exchanges are reverse-payment settlement agreements that
trade consideration—other than an agreement not to infringe on the patent—in exchange for the settlement money, but in reality the agreement
is just legitimizing the high price of the reverse-payment settlement.129
For example, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit
implied that such fraud may exist in the reverse-payment settlement context.130 In that settlement, the generic drug producer agreed to settle the
dispute and turn over ownership of one of its own patents in exchange
for $60 million and a portion of the profits from that patent.131 The pharmaceutical patent holder never subsequently used the generic company’s
patents.132 This led the court to suggest that the unused patents may be
merely a sham to help explain the excessive settlement payment.133 Although the K-Dur court did not directly label the consideration as a sham,
127. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Tamoxifen,
466 F.3d 187, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2006).
128. Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 83, 93 (2009).
129. Or as Carrier notes,
No longer are brand firms making simple cash payments for generics not to enter the
market. Instead, they are paying generics for IP licenses, for supplying raw materials or
finished products, and for helping to promote products. They are paying milestones, upfront payments, and development fees for unrelated products. In many cases, they are
guaranteeing that the settling generic will enjoy the exclusivity period. And in the latest
trend . . . they are agreeing not to launch authorized, brand-sponsored, generics.
Id.
130. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206.
131. Id. at 205.
132. Id. at 205–06.
133. Id. at 206.
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it sided with the plaintiffs who did so expressly.134 These sham exchanges may become more prevalent because they lend legitimacy to the otherwise suspicious reverse payment settlements.
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ACTAVIS DOES NOT END
THE CONFLICT
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Actavis,
a reverse-payment settlement antitrust case. 135 This much-anticipated
decision resolved which test should be applied in the federal courts: the
full rule of reason.136 This decision effectively rejected both of the approaches adopted in the circuit courts.137
Until the summer of 2013, the consensus amongst circuit courts
was that reverse payment settlements were presumptively valid unless
the terms of the settlement went beyond the scope of the patent.138 But
then the Third Circuit in K-Dur became the first court to adopt the quick
look rule of reason analysis139—an accelerated form of antitrust analysis
that was later rejected in Actavis.140 The advent of this circuit split is the
likely reason for the Supreme Court granting certiorari in Actavis and
deciding that all previously applied approaches were invalid.141
The Supreme Court’s decision to apply the full rule of reason antitrust analysis was probably the best judicial response to reverse-payment
settlement suits, but even so, the Court still does not require a determination of the patent’s validity.142 This is a wrong result, and it is up to Congress to correct the misstep. In order to understand why the Supreme
Court’s decision did not address the underlying problem of reverse134. Id. In K-Dur, the court stated,
Plaintiffs contend that the license was a sham and that the $60 million paid as royalties
for Niacor-SR was actually compensation for Upsher’s agreement to delay the entry of its
generic extended-release potassium tablet. On the other hand, defendants contend that
Schering’s board valued the license deal separately and that $60 million was its good
faith valuation of the licenses at the time.
Id.
135. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
136. Id. at 2226.
137. Id. at 2227 (finding error in the Eleventh Circuit’s presumptive approach—the “scope of
the patent test”); id. at 2237 (declining to adopt the FTC’s proposed quick-look rule of reason analysis).
138. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
139. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
140. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (declining to adopt the FTC’s proposed quick-look rule of
reason analysis).
141. See sources cited supra note 137.
142. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
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payment settlement suits, it is necessary to analyze what the Court was
rejecting: the scope of the patent test and the FTC test.
A. Watson and the Scope of the Patent Test
The predominant test adopted by the federal circuit courts prior to
Actavis was the scope of the patent test.143 The Second,144 Eleventh,145
and Federal Circuit146 adopted this particular test, whereas only one circuit, the Third Circuit,147 adopted a different test. The scope of the patent
test has a three-step analysis: (1) determine the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent; (2) determine the extent to which the agreements
exceed that scope; and (3) decide what the resulting anti-competitive effects are.148
The courts justified adopting the scope of the patent test for five
main reasons. First, patent law is inherently designed to have anticompetitive effects.149 Second, there is a strong policy in favor of settlements.150
Third, settlements are the most fiscally logical solution for the parties
involved in Paragraph IV litigation.151 Fourth, the courts are concerned
about funding future pharmaceutical innovation.152 Fifth, the first-to-file
status of the generic producer does not prevent other companies from
challenging the validity of the patent.153
143. Id.; Watson, 677 F.3d at 1309.
144. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
145. Watson, 677 F.3d 1298; Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley
Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
146. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
147. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
148. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066.
149. Id. at 1064; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333.
150. The Tamoxifen court justifies its decision based on the policy in favor of settlements. This
is clear through its statements that courts are “‘bound to encourage’ the settlement of litigation.” In
re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202; see also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333; Schering-Plough, 402
F.3d at 1064 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309).
151. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006).
152 . Posited first by pharmaceutical lobbying groups during the creation of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, “A group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form articulated
its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create unnecessary
litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.” H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984)
(original capitalization omitted). Also, “[r]ules severely restricting patent settlements might also be
contrary to the goals of the patent laws because the increased number of continuing lawsuits that
would result would heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation.” In re
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203. Although the courts also questioned the underlying validity of the patent
at question: “Perhaps it is unwise to protect patent monopolies that rest on such dubious patents. . . . Why, after all—viewing the settlement through an antitrust lens—should the potential
competitor be permitted to receive such a windfall at the ultimate expense of drug purchasers?” Id. at
208, 210.
153. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1334.
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The scope-of-the patent approach was characterized as the per se
legality approach to reverse payment settlements. 154 The standard for
finding the settlements to be anticompetitive is incredibly high: “[S]o
long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the
patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that
which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture
and distribution of the patented product.”155
Watson—the Eleventh Circuit case that the Supreme Court reversed—reaffirmed the scope of the patent test and added more certainty
to how prior cases would be construed in that jurisdiction.156 The court
“clarified that its use in an earlier case of the phrase ‘strength of the patent’ referred to ‘the potential exclusionary scope of the patent,’ which
means ‘the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent’s face and not the
underlying merits of the infringement claim.’”157
The Eleventh Circuit—while implying that it was too complex for
application—understood what would truly be required to know whether
the settlement was valid:
[It] is worth emphasizing that what the FTC proposes is that we attempt to decide how some other court in some other case at some
other time was likely to have resolved some other claim if it had
been pursued to judgment. If we did that we would be deciding a
patent case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the patent case, a turducken task.158

Despite its satirical tone, this court accurately portrayed the complexity
facing the court in reverse-payment settlement suits. This “turducken
task,” as labeled by the Eleventh Circuit inspired the legislative solution
proposed in Part V below.

154. For example, the Federal Circuit first acknowledged the presumptive nature of the scope
of the patent test through its statement that “a patent is presumed to be valid.” Id. at 1336. As one
commentator notes, “Courts then imperceptibly shifted from punishing conduct ‘outside the scope’
of the patent to immunizing conduct ‘within the scope’ of the patent. In doing so, the test took a
dramatic turn toward deference.” Carrier, supra note 85, at 3.
155. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.
163, 208 (1931)).
156. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Carrier, supra note
85, at 4.
157. Carrier, supra note 85, at 4 (quoting Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311 n.8).
158. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315.

2014]

Inevitable Imbalance

1079

B. K-Dur and the FTC Test
Meanwhile, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the FTC finally
found a jurisdiction—the Third Circuit Court of Appeals—that approved
of its approach to reverse payment settlements.159 The Third Circuit test
was an intentional departure from the doctrine set forth by the other circuits:
[T]he finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market
as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade, which
could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive
benefit.160

This approach applied the quick-look rule of reason and therefore created
a rebuttable presumption that reverse payment settlements were violations of antitrust law.161
The court justified its adoption of this test as an extension of the per
se antitrust violation test created in Andrx—the outside-the-scope patent
test. 162 It also noted that it “embrace[d] [the Andrx] court’s common
sense conclusion that ‘[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the
challenging generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent
of the parties entering the agreement.’”163 The court also disdained the
idea that “[the scope-of-the-patent] approach nominally protects intellectual property, not on the strength of a patent holder’s legal rights, but on
the strength of its wallet.”164 Essentially, this decision was based on the
apparent facts of the case rather than a compilation of legal doctrines.
The court suggested that reverse payment settlements, on their face, seem
to be anticompetitive, unreasonable restraints on trade.165
This fact-based analysis is based on inherently incomplete information because the quick-look rule of reason does not assess whether the
patent is valid, but rather presumes the patent’s invalidity. This approach
would only be appropriate if it was correct to assume that all reverse
payment settlements are near per se antitrust violations.

159. See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
160. Id. at 218.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
164. Id. at 217.
165. Id. at 218.
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C. Actavis Wrongly Avoids the Turducken Task
In the end, Actavis oversimplified the problem in reverse payment
settlements to be primarily a question of antitrust law.166 The Court initially decided that antitrust and patent law would be applied in each reverse-payment settlement case.167 Then the Court’s job became the simple question of determining which antitrust doctrine to apply, and the
Court adopted the full rule of reason analysis.168
But the Court did not resolve two problems that will result in future
litigation. First, the Court did not outline clear guidelines about how to
assess the litigation for the lower courts; rather, it left the process for determining antitrust liability to the lower courts.169 And second, the Court
raised and dismissed the need to litigate the underlying patent validity in
a full patent infringement suit.170 In Actavis, the Court stated, “[T]he size
of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for
a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”171 Rather, the structure of
the lawsuit and the settlement size as a “surrogate for patent strength” are
the core of the reverse-payment settlement problem. The settlement
amount as a surrogate for patent strength is a problem because this ignores the scholarship suggesting that the size of the settlement may relate
more to the profitability of the drug than the strength or weakness of the
patent. The structure is a problem because of the remaining turducken
task, which will lead the lower courts to resolve a question that many
experts have not been able to answer: how do you assess whether a settlement is anticompetitive if you do not resolve whether the patent is valid?
166. “And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably
diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.” FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227
(2013).
167. Id. at 2231. Or as the Court stated,
[I]t would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them
against procompetitive [sic] antitrust policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the
[c]ircuit’s view that the only pertinent question is whether ‘the settlement agreement . . . fall[s] within’ the legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s ‘exclusionary potential,’ . . .
this Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining
the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is
conferred by a patent.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
168. Id. at 2238.
169. “We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.” Id.
170. Id. at 2236–37.
171. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
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These problems were likely left unanswered because they need a
congressional, not a judicial, solution.
D. Inevitability of An Insufficient Judicial Outcome
The scope of the patent test would have vindicated the interests of
the patent holders and the generic manufacturers, and would have protected both parties’ investments in new research. The FTC test would
have furthered the interests of consumers and the government as a consumer. But the solution proposed by the Court answered only one question about the reverse-payment settlement analysis—which antitrust test
to use—without resolving the conflict. The patent will not be held per se
valid without any analysis of antitrust implications, but the full rule of
reason is the most nuanced and time-consuming form of antitrust analysis. Moreover, the analysis is gutted of its central inquiry. The Court did
not define the appropriate process for courts to use when deciding to accept or reject a reverse-payment settlement agreement, other than to dismiss the need to litigate the underlying patent validity. Therefore, the
rule of reason analysis will require lower courts to assess the potential
anticompetitive effects of the agreement without ever determining if the
patent is actually weak.
The Court chose the full rule of reason analysis because neither
presumption test was appropriate.172 A decision in favor of the scope of
the patent test would essentially decide the issue in favor of the patent
holder.173 A decision in favor of the FTC test would have trapped the
patent holders, and potentially generic drug companies, in litigation and
afforded a presumption in favor of the FTC and consumers.174 It is not
appropriate for the courts either to decide that the patent is presumptively
valid or to presume that an antitrust violation occurred merely because a
reverse-payment settlement exists.175
Despite being the best judicial solution, the Court’s solution fails to
directly address the question of patent validity, which is the key to reverse payment settlements. The full rule of reason analysis makes the
172. See infra Part IV.
173. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
174. Scott A. Backus, Comment, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust Violations?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 417 (2007).
175. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120 (“Selecting the wrong antitrust analysis may
result in either prosecution of procompetitive [sic] or neutral business conduct (‘Type I error’)—or
failure to prosecute activity that is anticompetitive (‘Type II error’).”). For further comparison of
Type I and Type II errors, see id. at 120–21.

1082

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1059

results of future litigation murky because it focuses on the reversepayment settlement, not the patent.176 Now, therefore, as future courts
apply the full rule of reason analysis to reverse payment settlements, they
will base their decisions on inherently incomplete information about the
strength of the patent.
IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REVERSE-PAYMENT
SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION
Since the original enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act and the
subsequent advent of reverse-payment settlement litigation, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives have proposed bills that attempt
to solve the reverse-payment settlement problem.177 Thus far, no bill addressing the reverse-payment settlement issue directly has passed both
houses of Congress.178 And more importantly, none of the proposed legislation directly addresses whether the underlying patent is valid or invalid.179
Legislators are acting in response to the courts rather than analyzing
the fundamental underlying problem: uncertainty about the strength of
the underlying patent. All of the pieces of proposed legislation focus on
defining reverse payment settlements as anticompetitive, which seemingly responds to the decisions of the majority of circuit courts.180 For example, Senate Bill 214—the only current piece of legislation addressing
the issue of reverse payment settlements—attempts to create a presump-

176. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
177. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (creating a presumption that reverse payment settlements are anticompetitive: “an agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and be
unlawful” if a reverse-payment settlement occurs); H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd Sess. 2012)
(“Conduct Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly be a party to any
agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim in which” a reverse-payment settlement
occurs); S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of
2009, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009) (making reverse payments per se illegal under the FTC Act);
see Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97.
178. Senate Bill 214 is the only piece of legislation in the current Congress that addresses
reverse payment settlements, and it has only been introduced into the Senate. See S. 214; see also
Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97 (2009) (discussing past reverse-payment settlement bills, all of
which proposed presumption based approaches to the problem).
179. See Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97.
180. For example,
The purposes of this Act are . . . (1) to enhance competition by stopping anticompetitive
agreements between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition from generic drugs; and (2) to support the purpose and intent
of antitrust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry
that harm consumers.
S. 214 § (2)(b).
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tion that reverse payment settlements are invalid.181 This bill is problematic because it presumes that all reverse payment settlements are presumptively antitrust violations and does not account for reverse payment
settlements with a valid underlying patent. 182 All other proposed bills
regarding reverse payment settlements share the same fundamental problem.183 And due to this fundamental problem, no bill proposing a presumption of antitrust has been enacted.184
The Actavis decision effectively rejected the assumption of validity
adopted by the plurality of circuit courts.185 The stated purpose of Senate
Bill 369—the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act—was to “stop
anticompetitive agreements between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition from generic
drugs,” all to ensure that courts “do not make improper presumptions”
when reviewing the agreements.186
Furthermore, none of the proposed bills directly address the issue of
patent strength. Although Senate Bill 214 does list out “competitive factors” which might overcome the presumption that a reverse-payment settlement is invalid, the consideration of such factors is primarily within
the discretion of the FTC.187 Furthermore, nothing in the proposed legislation suggests that the FTC would then be empowered to litigate the
validity of the underlying patent. The bill only allows the FTC to “initiate a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section against the parties to any agreement resolving or settling . . . a patent infringement
claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product.”188 And the remedy
under this structure is not necessarily patent invalidity, but rather civil

181. Id. §28(a)(2).
182. See the comparison of Type I and Type II errors in Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at
120–21.
183. See, e.g., H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd Sess. 2012) (“Conduct Prohibited. It shall be
unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly be a party to any agreement resolving or settling a
patent infringement claim in which” a reverse-payment settlement occurs); H.R. 1706, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009) (making reverse payments per se illegal under the FTC Act); see also Carrier, supra
note 128, at 90–97.
184. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (introduced in Senate); H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd
Sess. 2012) (introduced in the House of Representatives); S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)
(Resolution introduced in the Senate); S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (reported in Senate); see
Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97
185. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
186. Carrier, supra note 128, at 96 (quoting Substitute Amendment to S. 369 § 2(b)(1)(3),
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)).
187. S. 214 § 28(e)(1) (“The Federal Trade Commission may issue . . . regulations implementing and interpreting this section.”).
188. Id. § 28(a)(1).
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damages.189 Thus, the proposed bill’s remedies are activated by a presumption-based administrative process, not based on a full patent validity
suit.190
The presumption-based approach to reverse payment settlements
misses the nuance needed to address Paragraph IV settlements. The root
of the problem is that some of the settlements may be legitimate—
making a presumptive antitrust violation conclusion inappropriate191 —
while others may be anticompetitive—making per se legality inappropriate.192 Congress needs an approach that allows the courts to weigh both
options. The judge-based approach to this conundrum has been to advocate the adoption of the full rule of reason analysis.193 But a rule of reason analysis under Actavis will still require a court to consider whether
antitrust violations occurred without the court knowing whether the underlying patent is valid. The proposed legislation in Part V directly addresses the question of patent validity by realigning the ability to litigate
patent validity with the correct stakeholders.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: REALIGN STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS TO THEIR
ABILITY TO ACT THROUGH LEGISLATION
In this Part, section A explains the essential misalignment of stakeholders in the Hatch–Waxman regulatory scheme. Section B proposes
new legislation and explains the advantages of an invalidity-based approach to reverse payment settlements. Section C anticipates criticism of
the proposed legislation.
A. The Hatch–Waxman Act’s Misalignment of Stakeholders
As is shown through the discussion of the current judicial and legislative battles, the Hatch–Waxman Act suffers from a structural design
problem.194 Congress attempted to align the private interests of generic
drug producers with the public interests of consumers. 195 This choice
made sense for several reasons. First, the direct market beneficiaries of
non-patented drugs are generic drug producers. Second, Congress’s decision to encourage generic drug producers to file Paragraph IV ANDAs
189. Id. § 28(g).
190. See id. § 28(e)(1).
191. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120–21 (describing prosecution of Type I errors as
“condemning legitimate business conduct that is not anticompetitive”).
192. Id. at 121 (describing Type II Errors as failing to prosecute activity that is anticompetitive).
193. Id.
194. See supra Parts II–III.
195. See supra Part II.
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externalized the cost of finding and invalidating weak patents. Third,
when legislation requires pharmaceutical patent holders to respond by
either instigating litigation or conceding patent invalidity, the legislation
helps consumers by either testing or confirming patent invalidity.
Theoretically, the Hatch–Waxman regulatory scheme should vet
out weak patents that should be challenged and, potentially, invalidated.
The invalidation of weak patents would then benefit both the public sector consumers and the private sector generic producers. The generic producers would act as a proxy for the consumers, and all of these stakeholders—generic producers, government, and consumers—would benefit. But by externalizing the costs, Congress has also externalized control
over the efficacy of the Hatch–Waxman Act in Paragraph IV litigations.
Post-enactment, generic drug producers were empowered as the proxy
litigators, and therefore proxy negotiators of the pro-invalidation position, despite being self-interested private actors.
This private actor self-interest was apparently the point of leverage
that the pharmaceutical patent holders focused on in their negotiations
for reverse payment settlements. The pharmaceutical patent holders
found that if they could provide a financial benefit to the generic producers while simultaneously eliminating the risk of litigation, some generic
producers would be willing to negotiate a settlement.196 The courts found
the first iteration of this settlement strategy to be per se antitrust violations: outside-the-scope patent settlements.197 The second iteration of this
settlement strategy is the reverse-payment settlement: within-the-scope
patent settlements.198 The third potential iteration of this settlement strategy is fraudulent business agreements, which include sham consideration
as well as money in exchange for settlement.199
The settling parties’ progressively subtle strategies to settle Paragraph IV litigations suggest that it is tempting for private actors to maintain patent validity, regardless of patent strength or weakness. Because of
the nature of settlement negotiations between private actors, regulatory
agencies—such as the FTC—are only able to collect circumstantial evidence of potential antitrust violations.
Still, the criticism set forth by the Watson court—the decision that
Actavis reversed—is well-taken. 200 Congress created a structure where
196. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
197. See supra Part II.A.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. See supra Part II.C.; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
200. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315. The court stated,
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antitrust regulators are one step removed from executing the actual goals
of the public. Congress also created a system that empowers selfinterested parties, rather than parties working for the public interest, to
act as proxies for consumer interests in pharmaceutical patent invalidity
suits. Congress should not have created a system that encourages litigation, a context that makes anticompetitive behavior attractive, and subsequently fails to monitor or create disincentives to prevent antitrust violations.
B. Proposed Legislation to Solve the Reverse-Payment
Settlement Problem
The government should be empowered to assume its proper role in
advocating for consumers. In response to this regulatory mismatch, Congress should empower a regulatory agency—potentially the FTC—to
bring patent invalidity suits directly. Currently, the U.S. government may
not bring a patent validity suit unless an antitrust violation has been
found and patent validity relates to relief.201
The key precedent to this doctrine is United States v. Glaxo Group,
Ltd.202 Here, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government could bring a
patent validity suit after it had proven that the parties committed an antitrust violation if the relief in the case was related to patent validity.203 In
Glaxo, the Government brought and won an antitrust suit against a pharmaceutical patent holder for its anticompetitive licensing of its patented
drug.204 Along with the antitrust suit, the Government brought a patent
invalidity suit against the patent holder.205 But the lower court “struck the
claims of patent validity from the Government’s complaint.”206 The SuIn closing, it is worth emphasizing that what the FTC proposes is that we attempt to decide how some other court in some other case at some other time was likely to have resolved some other claim if it had been pursued to judgment. If we did that we would be
deciding a patent case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the patent case, a
turducken task.
Id.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
[The Court] think[s] it would have been appropriate, if it appeared that the Government’s
[antitrust] claims for further relief were substantial, for the court to have also entertained
the Government’s challenge to the validity of those patents. In arriving at this conclusion,
we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent by basing
an antitrust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid.
Id. at 59.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 59.
204. Id. at 56.
205. Id.
206. Id.

2014]

Inevitable Imbalance

1087

preme Court remanded for consideration in part because “[i]t is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be
protected in his monopoly.”207
A proposed legislative amendment, in the spirit of Glaxo, may
solve the reverse-payment settlement problem. A reverse-payment settlement may be an indicator that a patent would be found invalid. Legislators should take the patent’s potential invalidity and antitrust implications seriously, particularly in light of the outside-the-scope settlements
that occurred early in Paragraph IV litigations.
To enable the government to act, this Comment proposes the following amendment, which has two main goals.208 First, the amendment
gives the government standing to litigate invalidity suits after a reversepayment settlement has occurred. Second, assuming that the patent is
found invalid, the amendment creates a rebuttable presumption that an
antitrust violation occurred.
The proposed amendment:
(a) Standing. The Federal Trade Commission [or another agency]
shall have standing to sue a NDA holder to determine patent
validity if:
(i)
an ANDA filer receives anything of value from a NDA
holder;
(ii) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the
ANDA product for any period of time; and
(iii) what is received by the ANDA filer in (i) is valued over
seven million USD.
(b) Infringement. If (a) is satisfied, then the infringement requirements in the Patent Act are also satisfied.
(c) Antitrust Presumption. If any suit is instigated under section (a)
and the patent involved is found to be invalid, then:

207. Id. at 58 (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v. Cormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
208. The language of this proposed amendment is substantially taken from the language in
Senate Bill 214, but the legislation outlined here functions differently. See generally S. 214, 113th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). The proposed legislation bifurcates the reverse settlement suit into a patent
invalidity suit and a subsequent antitrust challenge contingent on finding the patent invalid.
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antitrust suit(s) may be instigated against the ANDA filer or the NDA holder by the Federal Trade Commission
[or another agency]; and
the exchange described in section (a) shall be presumed
to be anticompetitive behavior, placing the burden on the
ANDA filer and the NDA holder.

(d) Competitive Factors. In determining whether the parties to the
original settlement can overcome the presumption that antitrust
violations occurred under section (c), the fact finder shall consider:
(i)
the length of time remaining at the time of settlement,
until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared
with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product;
(ii) the value to consumers of the competition from the
ANDA product allowed under the agreement;
(iii) the form and amount of consideration received by the
ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling the
patent infringement claim;
(iv) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by
winning the patent litigation;
(v) the reduction in the NDA holder’s revenues if it had lost
the patent litigation;
(vi) the type of underlying patent involved;
(vii) the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and
(viii) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion,
deems relevant to its determination of competitive effects under this subsection.
(e) Penalties.
(i)
Each person, partnership, or corporation that violates or
assists in the violation of this section shall forfeit and
pay to the United States a civil penalty sufficient to deter
violations of this section, but in no event shall the penalty be greater than three times the value received by the
party that is reasonably attributable to a violation of this
section. If no such value has been received by the NDA
holder, the penalty to the NDA holder shall be sufficient
to deter violations, but in no event shall the penalty be
greater than three times the value given to the ANDA
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filer reasonably attributable to the violation of this section. Such penalty shall accrue to the United States and
may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Federal
Trade Commission [or another agency], in its own name
by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose,
in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation that violates this section.
In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered to grant mandatory injunctions and such other
and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate.
Civil penalty. In determining the amount of the civil
penalty described in this section, the court shall take into
account:
(A) the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of
the violation;
(B) with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of violations, the ability to
pay, any effect on the ability to continue doing
business, profits earned by the NDA holder,
compensation received by the ANDA filer, and
the amount of commerce affected; and
(C) other matters that justice requires.

(f) Definitions.
(i)
ANDA.
The
term
“ANDA”
means
an abbreviated new drug application, as defined under
section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 355(j)).
(iii) ANDA filer. The term “ANDA filer” means a party who
has filed an ANDA with the Food and Drug Administration.
(iv) NDA. The term “NDA” means a new drug application,
as defined under section 505(b) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)).
(v) NDA holder. The term “NDA holder” means:
(A) the party that received FDA approval to market
a drug product pursuant to an NDA;
(B) a party owning or controlling enforcement of the
patent listed in the Approved Drug Products
With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations
(commonly known as the “FDA Orange Book”)
in connection with the NDA; or
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the predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
and affiliates controlled by, controlling, or under
common control with any of the entities described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) (such control to be presumed by direct or indirect share
ownership of 50% or greater), as well as the licensees, licensors, successors, and assigns of
each of the entities.

If Congress enacts this proposed amendment, the new law would
(1) align consumer interests to the party of the patent invalidity suit, essentially effectuating the original goal of the Hatch–Waxman structure;
(2) empower the regulatory agency that monitors reverse payment settlements with the ability to prioritize which settlements seem to be protecting weak patents; (3) create a disincentive for generic drug producers
to protect particularly weak patents along with patent holders; (4) break
the potential for a code of silence amongst insiders; (5) have less dependence on the slow-moving decisions of the federal courts; (6) anticipate future issues with sham consideration; and (7) in some cases, eliminate the need to decide a patent case within an antitrust case by properly
dividing the suit into stages to the benefit of consumers.
One of the government’s unique roles is to protect citizens in situations where they cannot protect themselves—when citizens are externalities. By contrast, this is neither the role nor the expectation of private
actors or businesses. In the case of the Hatch–Waxman Act, the government tried to turn private actors into proxies for consumers, but the application of the Act fell short of expectations. Still, the Act and the
FTC’s monitoring succeeded in discovering when these potentially anticompetitive agreements have been made. In light of the generic drug
producer’s potentially anticompetitive actions, it would not make sense
to further delegate litigation to the private actors.
Instead, Congress should empower a government agency to exercise its discretion in bringing suits. This Comment proposes granting this
ability to the FTC because it has spearheaded monitoring and scrutiny of
reverse payment settlements thus far. 209 Thus, the agency already has
practice at targeting suspicious reverse payments. The FTC is uniquely
situated to exercise its discretionary power to bring invalidity suits. But
ultimately, it does not matter which agency fulfills this role as long as it

209. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 17, at 1–2.
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is empowered to invalidate weak patents and prevent antitrust violations
when reverse payment settlements occur.
Although generic drug producers may have colluded to help hide
anticompetitive and weak patents, sufficiently high antitrust violation
damages might deter generic drug producers from settling in future
Hatch–Waxman litigation. By settling, the generic companies received
significant benefits without exposing themselves to much risk. Because
of reverse payment settlements, generic companies have been able to
make higher profits by doing nothing, rather than by actually creating
generic drugs.210 If the proposed legislation was enacted, the generic producers would risk as much as they gain if they were eventually found to
have wrongfully colluded in reverse payment settlements. This deterrent
would help realign the generic companies’ interests with the public.
At a minimum, the new legislation would divide the private interests, which could break the potential silence between insiders. While it
might be impossible to convince the patent holders that they can benefit
from invalidity and competition, it is possible to convince generic producers that they can benefit from off-patent drugs. The proposed
amendment would re-divide the private interests and prevent the anticompetitive settlements between the parties. Furthermore, the bright-line
settlement amount would allow both companies to plan and decide the
relative strength of their suit. It would provide an incentive to settle early
if the generic did not have a strong suit, and it would provide an incentive against settling if the generic producer expected to gain more than $7
million net profit from producing the drug. This ability to plan around
these incentives may keep these expensive patent and antitrust suits from
clogging the courts with litigation. Thus, the legislation would also promote efficiency with regard to the courts.
The proposed amendment would formalize the goals of Congress
such that the judiciary would not need to legislate from the bench. The
decision in Actavis to apply the full rule of reason analysis arose to respond to the unique and unanticipated problems of reverse payment settlements. Furthermore, the decision in Actavis came ten years after the
first Paragraph IV reverse settlements were litigated. 211 This slowmoving and backward-looking approach is not nimble enough to address
the remaining problems with reverse-payments settlements.212 Unlike the
ultimate ruling in the courts, a legislative amendment would clarify and
210. See supra note 60.
211. Compare Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), with
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
212. See supra Part III.
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solidify the government’s expectations of the pharmaceutical patent
holders and the generic companies. Also, because of the relative competencies of the legislature, it can address a broader scope of issues than the
judiciary and actively advocate for the consumer–public interest by invalidating weak patents.
The amendment would also address the concerns of the Watson
court in regard to deciding a patent case within an antitrust case—the
turducken task.213 First, the amendment intentionally stages litigation to
consider validity before addressing whether antitrust violations occurred.
In the first stage of litigation, the presumption of validity remains with
the patent holder to satisfy the rights of the patent holder. The amendment only modifies the government’s ability to bring a cause of action.
Second, it is not a general grant of standing to the government. The
agency would only be able to bring invalidity suits when a sufficiently
large reverse-payment settlement occurs. Thus, the government would
not have the unchecked ability to challenge pharmaceutical patents.
Third, the government could win or lose this cause of action. If the government lost, then the matter would end. If the government won, the patent holder would still be able to defend itself from antitrust litigation and
have the chance to prove the validity of the suit after the initial presumption had been satisfied. Lastly, the decision of the agency to move on and
litigate the antitrust suit is also discretionary. If the patent was weak, then
the agency could choose to proceed; but if the decision was close and the
validity of the patent was a hard question, then the agency may opt to
stop at finding the patent invalid. The shift in presumption in the second
suit would allow the parties to defend the reasonableness of the patent
claim, and any pro-competitive reasons for the reverse-payment settlement would make antitrust damages not necessarily a foregone conclusion.
Furthermore, the creation of stages within the litigation mirrors
Congress’s goals in creating the Hatch–Waxman Act. The Act was created to facilitate the entry of generics into the pharmaceutical market and
get lower priced drugs to consumers.214 In the proposed legislation, the
government agency would be empowered to effectively complete the suit
that the generic producer initiated. Regardless of how a patent might be
invalidated, consumers will benefit if the patent monopoly is broken. If
the agency feels that there was wrongdoing on the part of the parties to
the settlement—that the agreement was an anticompetitive attempt to
213. See supra note 200.
214. S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (resolution introduced in the Senate).
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exercise a limited monopoly—then the government can pursue an antitrust suit against the settlement parties. Thus, in descending order of importance, the priorities effectuated are first to benefit the public through
generic entry, and second to punish and deter anticompetitive behavior.
In the end, providing a cause of action to a government agency better aligns the roles of the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch in
relation to reverse payment settlements. The Executive Branch’s role is
to effectuate the intended policies of Congress and protect the public
through the execution of such laws. The proper role of the Judicial
Branch is to act as a neutral arbiter between parties in conflict. Here,
public and private interests are in conflict, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Actavis did not presumptively favor the private interests
through the scope of the patent test, nor did it favor the public interests
through the FTC test. Furthermore, the Actavis decision failed to provide
clear guidance on how to apply the full rule of reason analysis. The first
two options were not sufficiently neutral, and the final option left the
private parties and the FTC unsure of how to conform their actions to the
law.
Meanwhile, the proposed amendment would empower the government agency to act in a limited way. It would give guidance to private
actors about how to conform their behavior because of the clear brightline expectations within the amendment. And it would allow the court to
maintain its proper role as a neutral arbiter when the interests of public
and private actors come into conflict.
C. Response to Anticipated Criticism of the Proposed Legislation
Just as the Hatch–Waxman Act has been criticized since its enactment, the proposed amendment will inevitably be criticized as imperfect
as well. In an attempt to advocate for its enactment, this section addresses anticipated criticism of the proposed legislation. First, this section addresses concerns about how this action may harm innovation. Second,
this section considers the practical consequences of the proposed litigation upon Paragraph IV filers.
First, the strongest policy defense of patent holders’ rights to a monopoly is that those monopolies fund future innovation. While this is
true, the patent holder should only be protected so far as it is actually
innovating. As the court in Glaxo noted, “It is as important to the public
that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monop-
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oly. . . .”215 Non-innovative patents do not serve innovation. Patents that
are found invalid under the proposed legislation should logically be
deemed fatally weak. Furthermore, under the proposed legislation the
patent holder maintains its presumption of validity throughout the invalidity suit. Thus, the rights of a patent holder are maintained, but only
protected so long as the new product is actually innovative.
The proposed litigation may also be criticized as a deterrent to litigation under Paragraph IV of the Hatch–Waxman Act, but this is the
tradeoff that reverse payment settlements require. Generic producers may
be more hesitant to file Paragraph IV ANDAs because patent holders
may attempt to drive the cost above $7 million to make the decision economically unsound. But this is the price of creating a bright-line rule.
Generic producers who still believe that they may benefit more from filing than the company might lose by litigating the case will be able to
make self-interested choices with clear fiscal margins in mind. The Act
was created to facilitate generic drug entry; it was not created to give the
generic companies leverage so that pharmaceutical patent holders would
pay them to help protect their patents’ validity.216
Critics may suggest that the high costs of litigation would be a burden on the government in a time when federal funding is already limited.
But the treble damages and the benefits to other government goals and
programs will more than compensate the government and the consumers
for the cost of litigating the patent validity or antitrust suits. The government is on many sides of this issue. Congress negotiated the Hatch–
Waxman Act and would enact any future legislation. The FTC spearheaded the fight against the antitrust violations in reverse payment settlements. And the government is also a consumer in that it subsidizes
medical care. These considerations should quell complaints that the government is spending money on litigation because of how many goals are
accomplished through the litigation of fatally weak patents.
Admittedly, the proposed solution places most of the cost upon the
pharmaceutical patent holder, but the property rights of the patent holders are not being arbitrarily challenged. Under the proposed legislation,
there is a threshold requirement of a suspicious reverse-payment deal
prior to FTC validity challenges. Patent holders may suggest that this
will create unfair costs to the patent holders, but it seems reasonable for
the patent holder to defend the patent’s validity in court for such a lucrative benefit. Perhaps the Hatch–Waxman Act and this amendment will
215. United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 58 (1973) (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Cormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
216. See supra Part I.A.
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decrease the profit margins of the pharmaceutical patent holders, but the
historical expectations of profitability are partially based on the limited
challenges to invalidity and criticized extension of monopolies beyond
the patent term. The natural result of Congress’s corrective action may be
that the profits to the industry would shrink. Relevant questions include
the following: Do the profit margins deserve to shrink? Was the high
profitability of the pharmaceutical industry partially based on illegitimate, anticompetitive practices? If so, then Congress should continue to
legislate so that private actors do not benefit wrongfully off of the legitimately earned wages of the public at large.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took over a decade to grant certiorari on a reverse settlement payment case. During that time, consumers may have
lost billions of dollars due to reverse payment settlements. Congress
should not allow the powerful self-interest of pharmaceutical patent
holders to go unchecked. Although Congress created a uniquely litigious
regulatory scheme in the Hatch–Waxman Act, this is not an excuse for
private parties or the government to allow antitrust violations to be beyond review. It is true that we do not know if antitrust violations occurred or if the patents are invalid. But, if the government allows potential anticompetitive settlements to persist unquestioned, it would fail in
its role of advocating for the interest of the consumers.
For these reasons, Congress should enact legislation that targets the
source of the reverse-payment settlement problem: weak patent validity.
The proposed legislation is not a sweeping standard that would allow the
FTC to litigate in any circumstance. Rather, the language limits the scope
of the standing granted to the specific context where the actions of the
private parties indicate that anticompetitive behavior may have occurred.
This has the added benefits of allowing the FTC to regulate the potentially anticompetitive behavior—reverse payment settlements—while simultaneously giving the private actors notice that the settlements may trigger
a patent invalidity suit. Providing notice to the private actors allows them
to plan in such a way so as to avoid litigation, or risk the FTC exercising
its discretion to litigate.
Legislation is preferable to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Actavis because the Court did not suggest that the FTC challenge the validity of a patent; now, only Congress can. Patent validity is the heart of
the reverse-payment settlement problem. Pharmaceutical patent holders
are not fighting for their right to settle Paragraph IV litigation, but to protect their patents’ validity. The Hatch–Waxman Act was not created to
force patent holders and generics into litigation, but to facilitate generic
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market entry by invalidating weak patents. Antitrust damages will not
benefit consumers, but invalidating weak patents that drive up consumer
costs will. In the end, litigating the patents is the solution to the actual
problem: fatally weak pharmaceutical patents.

